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shown that serious risks from national disasters such as
floods, hurricanes, an d earthqu akes gen erate relative ly
little public concern and demand for protection.3,4

1.0 Introduction
The practice of risk assessm ent has stead ily increase d in
prominence during the past sev eral decades, as r isk
managers in government and industry have sought to
develop more effective ways to meet public demands for
a safer and healthier en vironm ent. Doz ens of scien tific
disciplines have been mobilized to provide technical
information about risk, and billions of dollars have been
expended to create this information and distill it in the
context of risk assessm ents.

Such discrepancies are seen as irrational by many harsh
critics of public perceptions. These critics draw a sharp
dichotomy betwee n the exp erts and the p ublic. Ex perts are
seen as purveying risk assessments, characterized as
objective, analytic , wise, and rational — based upon the
real risks. In contrast, the public is seen to rely upon
perceptions of risk that are sub jective, often hypoth etical,
emotio nal, foolish, and irrational (see, e.g., refs. 5 or 6).
Weiner 7 defends the dichotomy, arg uing that “This
separation of reality and perception is pervasive in a
technically sophisticated society, and serves to achieve a
necessary emotional distance . . .” (p. 495).

Ironically, as our society and other industrialized nations
have expended this great effort to make life safer and
healthier, many in the public have become more, rather
than less, concerned about risk. These individuals see
themselves as expos ed to m ore seriou s risks than were
faced by people in the past, and th ey believ e that this
situation is getting worse rather than better. Nuclear and
chemical technologies (except for medicines) have been
stigmatized by being perceived as entailing unn aturally
great risks.1 As a result, it has been difficult, if not
impossible, to find host sites for disposing of high-level
or low-level radioac tive wastes, or for incinerato rs,
landfills, and other chem ical facilities.

In sum, polarized views, controversy, and overt conflict
have become pe rvasive within risk assessm ent and risk
manageme nt. A desperate search for salvation through
risk-communication efforts beg an in the m id-1980 s — ye t,
despite some localized successes, this effort has not
stemmed the major con flicts or reduced much of the
dissatisfaction with risk manag emen t. This dissatisfaction
can be traced , in part, to a failure to appreciate the complex
and socially determined nature of the concept “risk.” In the
remainder of this paper, I shall illustrate this co mplex ity
and point toward the need for new definitions of risk and
new ap proach es to risk m anagem ent.

Public perceptions of risk have been found to determine
the priorities and legislative agendas of regulatory bodies
such as the Enviro nmen tal Protection Agenc y, muc h to
the distress of agency technical experts who argue that
other hazards deserve higher priority. The bulk of EPA’s
budget in recent years has gone to hazardous wast e
primarily because the public believes that the cleanup of
Superfund sites is the most serious environmental threat
that the coun try faces. H azards su ch as in door air
pollution are considered more serious health risks by
experts but are not perceived that way by the public.2

2.0 The Need for a New Perspective
New perspectives and new approaches are need ed to
manage risks effectively in our society. Social science
research has provided some valuable insights into the
nature of the pro blem th at, without indicating a clear
solution, do point to some promising prescriptive actions.

Great disparities in mon etary exp enditures designed to
prolong life may also be traced to public perceptions of
risk. As noteworthy as the large sums of money devoted
to protection from ra diation an d chem ical toxins are the
relatively small sums expended to reduce mundane
hazards such as automobile accidents. Other studies have

For examp le, early studies of risk perception demonstrated
that the pu blic’s conc erns cou ld not simp ly be blamed on
ignorance or irrationality. Instead, research has shown that
many of the public’s reactions to risk can be attributed to
a sensitivity to technical, social, and psychological
qualities of hazards that are not well-m odeled in technical
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risk assessments (e.g., qualities such as uncertainty in risk
assessments, perceived inequity in the distribution of risks
and benefits, and aversion to being exposed to risks that
are involuntary, not under one’s control, or dreaded). The
important role of social values in risk perception and risk
acceptan ce has thu s becom e appare nt. 8

models, assumptions, and subjective assessment techniques
(intuitive risk assessments), which are sometimes very
different from the scientists’ models.
One way in w hich sub jectivity permeates risk assessm ents
is in the dependence of such assessments on judgments at
every stage of the process, from the initial structuring of a
risk problem to deciding which endpoints or consequences
to include in the analysis, identifying and estimating
exposures, choosing dose-response relationships, and so
on.

More recently, another important aspect of the riskperception problem has com e to be reco gnized. T his is
the role of trust. In recent years there have been numerous
articles and surveys pointing out the importance of trust
in risk manage ment and docum enting the extrem e distrust
we now h ave in many of the individuals, industries, and
institutions responsib le for risk m anagem ent. 9 This
pervasive distrust has also been sho wn to b e strongly
linked to the perception that risks are unacceptably high
and to political activism to re duce those risks.

For example, even the apparently simple task of choosing
a risk measure for a well-defined endpoint such as human
fatalities is surprising ly complex and judgmental. Table 1
shows a few of th e many different w ays that fatality risks
can be mea sured. H ow sho uld we decide which m easure to
use when p lanning a risk assessm ent, recognizing that the
choice is likely to make a big difference in how the risk is
perceived and evaluated?

A third insight pertains to the very nature of the concept
“risk.” Current approaches to risk assessment and risk
management are based upon th e traditional view of risk
as some objective function of probability (uncertainty)
and adverse consequences. I shall argue for a conception
of risk that is starkly different from this traditional view.
This new approach highlights the subjective and valueladen nature of risk and co nceptua lizes risk as a ga me in
which the rules must be socially negotiated within the
context of a specific problem.

Table 1. Some Ways of Expressing Mortality Risks

! Deaths per million people in the population
! Deaths per million people within x miles of the source
of exposure
! Deaths per unit of concentration
! Deaths per facility
! Deaths per ton of air toxic released
! Deaths per ton of air toxic absorbed by people
! Deaths per ton of chemical produced
! Deaths per million dollars of product produced
! Loss of life expectancy associated with exposure
to the hazard

3.0 The Subjective an d Value-L aden Na ture of Risk
Assessment
Attemp ts to manage risk must confront the question:
“What is risk?” The dominant conception views risk as
“the chance of injury, damage, or loss.” 10 The
probabilities and consequences of adv erse events are
assumed to be produced by physical and natural processes
in ways that can b e objectively qua ntified by risk
assessme nt. Much social scienc e analysis re jects this
notion, arguing instead tha t risk is inheren tly
subjective.11–16 In this view, risk does not exist “out
there,” independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to
be measured. Instead, human beings have invented the
concept risk to help them understand and cope with the
dangers and uncertainties of life. Although these dangers
are real, there is no such thing as “real risk” or “objective
risk.” The nu clear eng ineer’s pro babilistic risk es timate
for a nuclear accident or the toxicologist’s quantitative
estimate of a chem ical’s carcino genic risk a re both based
on theoretic al m odels, whose structure is subjective and
assumption-laden, and wh ose inpu ts are depe ndent o n
judgm ent. As we shall see, nonscientists have their own

An examp le taken from Wilson and Crouch 17 demonstrates
how the choice of one measure or another can make a
technology look either more or less risky. For example,
between 1950 and 1970, coal m ines b e ca m e much less
risky in terms of deaths from accidents per ton of coal, but
they became marginally riskier in terms of d eaths from
acciden ts per employee. Which measure one thinks more
approp riate for decision making depend s on one’s point of
view. From a national point of view, given that a certain
amount of coal ha s to be obtained, deaths per million tons
of coal is the m ore app ropriate m easure of risk, w hereas
from a labor lead er’s point o f view, d eaths per thousand
persons emplo yed m ay be m ore releva nt.
Each way of summarizing deaths embodies its own set of
values. 18 For examp le, “reduc tion in life expecta ncy” trea ts
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Equally striking changes in preference result from framing
the information about consequences in terms of either lives
saved or lives lost 20 or from describing an imp rovem ent in
a river’s water quality as a restoration of lost quality or an
improvement from th e curren t level. 21

deaths of young people as more important than deaths of
older people , who have less life expectancy to lose.
Simply counting fatalities treats deaths of the old and
young as equivalent; it also treats as equivalent deaths
that come im mediate ly after m ishaps and deaths that
follow pain ful and debilitating disease or long periods
during which m any wh o will not su ffer disease live in
daily fear of that outcome. Using “num ber of deaths” as
the summary indicator o f risk implies that it is as
important to prevent deaths of people who engage in an
activity by cho ice and d eaths of those who have been
benefiting from a risky activity or techn ology a s to
protect those wh o get no benefit fro m it. One can easily
imagine a range of arguments to justify different kinds of
unequal weightin gs for diffe rent kin ds of death s, but to
arrive at any selection requires a value judgment
concerning which deaths one considers most undesirable.
To treat the deaths as equal also involves a value
judgm ent.

W e now know that every form of presenting risk
information is a frame that has a strong influence on the
decision maker. Moreover, when we contemplate the
equivalency of lives saved vs. lives lost, mo rtality rates vs.
survival rates, restoring lost water quality vs. improving
water quality, and so forth, we see that there are often no
“right frames” or “wrong frames” — just “different
frames.”
3.2 The M ultidimensionality of Risk
As noted abov e, research has also sho wn that th e public
has a broad conception of risk, qualitative and complex,
that incorporates considerations such as uncertainty, dread,
catastroph ic potential, controllability, equity, risk to future
generations, and so forth, into the risk equation. In
contrast, experts’ perception s of risk are not clo sely related
to these dimensi ons or the character istics that und erlie
them. Instead, studies show that experts tend to see
riskiness as synonymous with expected mortality,
consistent with the dictionary definition given above and
consistent with the ways that risks tend to be characterized
in risk assessments (see, for example, ref. 22). As a result
of these different perspectiv es, man y conflicts over “risk”
may result from experts an d laypeo ple havin g different
definitions of the concept. In this light, it is not surprising
that expert rec itations of “risk statistics” often do little to
change pe ople’s attitudes and pe rceptions.

3.1 Framing the Risk Information
After a risk analysis has “negotiated,” all the subjective
steps of definin g the pro blem and its options, selecting
and measuring risk s in terms of particular ou tcomes,
determining the people at risk and their exposure
parameters, and so on, one comes to the presentation of
this inform ation to th e decis ion ma ker, often referred to
as “framin g.” This p rocess of p resentation is also rife with
subjectivity.
Numerous research studies have demonstrated that
different (but logica lly equivalent) ways of presenting the
same risk information can lead to different evaluations
and decisions. One dramatic example of this comes from
a study by McNeil, Pauker, Sox, and Tversky,19 who
asked people to imagine that they had lung cancer and
had to choose between two therapies, surgery or
radiation. The tw o therapies were described in some
detail. Then one group of subjects was presented with the
cumulative probabilities of surviving for varying lengths
of time after the treatment. A secon d group of subjec ts
received the same cumu lative prob abilities fram ed in
terms of dying rather than surviving (e.g., instead of
being told that 68% of those having surgery will have
survived after one year, they were told that 32% will have
died). Framing the statistics in terms of dying changed the
percentage of subjects choosing radiation therapy over
surgery from 18% to 44%. The effect was as strong for
physicians as for layp ersons.

There are legitimate, value-laden issues underlying the
multiple dimensions of public risk percep tions, and these
values need to be considered in risk-policy decisions. For
example, is risk from cancer (a dread disease) worse than
risk from au to acciden ts (not d readed)? Is a risk imposed
on a child m ore seriou s than a kn own risk accepte d
volunta rily by an adult? Are the deaths of 50 passengers in
separate autom obile accid ents equiv alent to th e deaths of
50 passengers in one airplane crash? Is the risk from a
polluted Superfund site worse if the site is located in a
neighborhood that has a number of other hazardous
facilities nearby? The difficult questions multiply when
outcomes other than human health and safety are
considered.
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preoccupation with reducing negligible risks as well a s to
inconsistent standards among health an d safety program s.
Breyer sees public misperceptions of risk and low levels of
mathematical understanding at the core of excessive
regulatory response. His proposed solution is to create a
small centralized administrative group charg ed with
creating uniformity and rationality in highly technical
areas of risk management. This group would be staffed by
civil servants w ith experience in health and environmental
agencies, Congress, and OMB. A parallel is drawn
between this group and the p restigious C onseil d’E tat in
France.

There are clearly multiple conceptions of risk.23 Dean and
Thompson 24 note that the traditional view of risk
characterized by th e event probabilities and consequences
treats subjective and contextual factors such as those
described above as secondary or accidental dimensions of
risk, just as coloration might be thought of as a secondary
or accidental dimension of an eye. Accidental dimensions
might be extremely influential in the formation of
attitudes toward risk, just as having blue or brown
coloration is influential in forming attitudes toward eyes.
Furthermore, it may be that all risks possess some
accidental d i m ensions, just a s all organs of sight are in
some way colored. Nevertheless, accidental dimensions
do not serve as criteria for determining whether someone
is or is not at risk, just as coloration is irrelevant to
whether something is or is not an eye.

Similar frustration with the costs of meeting pub lic
demands led the 104th C ongress to introduce numerous
bills designed to require all major new regulations to be
justified by extensive risk assessments. Proponents of this
legislation argued that such m easures w ere neces sary to
ensure that regulations are based upon “sound science” and
effectively reduce sig nificant risks at reasonable co sts.

I believe tha t the multid imensio nal, subjective, valueladen, frame-sensitive nature of risky decisions, as
described above, supports a very different view, which
Dean and Thompson call “the contextu alist concep tion.”
This conception places probabilities and consequences on
the list of relevant risk attributes along with voluntarine ss,
equity, and other important contextual parameters. On the
contextu alist view, the concept of risk is more like the
concept of a gam e than the concept of the eye. Games
have time limits, rules of play, opponents, criteria for
winning or losing, and so on, but none of these attributes
is essential to the concept of a game, nor is any of them
character istic of all games. Similarly, a contextualist view
of risk assumes that risks are characterized by some
combination of attributes such as volun tariness,
probability, intentionality, equity, and so on, but that no
one of these attributes is essential. Th e bottom line is that,
just as there is no universa l set of rules for games, there
is no universal set of characteristics for describing risk.
The characterization must de pend o n which risk gam e is
being played.

The language of this proposed legislation reflects the
traditional narrow view of risk and risk assessment based
“. . . only on the best reasonably available scientific data
and scientific understanding . . . ” Agencies are further
directed to develo p a system atic program for external peer
review using “expert bodies” or “other devices comprised
of participan ts selected on the basis of their expe rtise
relevant to the science s involve d . . . . 26 Public participation
in this process is advocated, but no mechanisms for this are
specified.
The proposals by Breyer and the 104 th Congress are
typical in their call for more a nd better te chnical an alysis
and expert oversight to rationalize risk man agem ent. There
is no doubt that technical analysis is vital for making risk
decisions better informed, more consistent, and more
accountable. How ever, v alue conflicts and pervasive
distrust in risk man a g em ent cannot easily be reduced by
technical analysis. Trying to address risk controversies
primarily with more science is, in fact, likely to ex acerbate
conflict.

3.0 Resolving Risk Conflicts
3.2 Process-Oriented Solutions
3.1 Tec hnical So lutions to R isk Con flicts
A major o bjective of this paper h as been to demo nstrate
the complexity of risk and its assessment. To summarize
the earlier discussions, danger is real, but risk is so cially
constructed. Risk assessment is inherently subjective and
represents a blendin g of scien ce and ju dgme nt with
important psycholog ical, social, cultural, and political
factors. This com plexity leads to a “contextualist view” in

There has been no shortage of high-level attention given
to the risk conflicts described in the introd uction to th is
paper. One prominent proposal by Justice Stephen
Breyer 25 attempts to break what he sees as a vicious circle
of public pe rception, congressional overreaction, and
conservative regulation that leads to ob sessive and costly
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which risk is conceptualized as a game whose rules must
be socially negotiated w ithin the context of sp ecific
decision problem s.
Whoever controls th e definition of risk (i.e., determines
the rules of the risk game) controls the rational solu tion to
the problem at hand. If you define risk one way, then one
option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the
safest or the best. If you define it another way, perhaps
incorporating qualitative characteristics and other
contextual factors, you will likely get a different ordering
of your action solu tions. 27 Defining risk is thus an
exercise in power.
The limitations of risk science, the importance and
difficulty of main taining trust, and the subjective and
contextual nature of the risk game point to the need for a
new approach—one that focuses upon introducing more
public participation into both risk assessm ent and risk
decision making in order to make the decision process
more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of
technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and pu blic
accepta nce of the resulting decisions. Work by scholars
and practitioners in Europe and North America has begun
to lay the foundations for imp roved m ethods o f public
participation within deliberative decision processes that
include negotiation, mediatio n, oversig ht com mittees, and
other form s of pub lic involve ment. 18, 28–31
Recognizing interested and affected citizens as legitimate
partners in the exercis e of risk asse ssment is n o shortterm panacea for the problems of risk management. But
serious attention to participation and process issues may,
in the long run, lead to more satisfying and successful
ways to manage risk.
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